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Abstract
This article investigates the main determinants of private investment in the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). After checking for unit root 
and co-integration, Error Correction Model is specified, and three estimators are 
performed:  Dynamic  Fixed-Effects,  Mean  Group,  and  Pooled  Mean  Group. 
Hausman tests show that the Dynamic Fixed-Effects Estimator is more efficient  
and  consistent  than  others.  Results  suggest  that,  in  the  short-run,  private 
investment  in  the  WAEMU  zone  is  determined  by  the  aggregate  demand 
conditions: gross domestic product and output gap, while, in the long-run, it is 
determined  by  gross  domestic  product,  and  political  stability.  The  short-run 
elasticity of gross domestic product and output gap are statistically significant and 
average to 5.7 and 0.06, respectively.  The long-run elasticity of gross domestic 
product and the semi-elasticity of political stability are statistically significant and 
average to 2.4 and -0.25, respectively. These finds imply that, to promote private 
investment in the WAEMU zone, there is a need among others for more proper 
design  and  implementation  of  aggregate  demand  management  policies,  and 
political framework stability.
Keywords: Private Investment, WAEMU, Dynamic Fixed-Effects Estimator.
JEL Code : C33, E21, F15.
1. - Introduction
The  In  recent  years,  the  West  African  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (WAEMU)  has 
experienced rapid economic  growth compared to  the average  of African countries.  While 
economic growth average 3.5 percent over 2000-09, it rose to an average of 5.0 percent over 
2010-15 in this  region.  However,  African countries  economic  growth are estimated  to  an 
average  of  4.4  percent  over  2010-15.  This  economic  progress  in  the  WAEMU  zone  is 
essentially  by  public  investment,  especially  in  basic  economics  infrastructures.  The  aim, 
according to policymakers' views, is to create conditions for private investment development 
and  more sustainable economic growth.
It is widely recognized that public investment are not enough to address sustainable economic 
growth challenges  in  developing  countries.  Thus,  private  investment  are  required  (United 
Nations,  2002).  These are  necessary to  complete  public  investment.  Private  investment  is 
therefore, as policymakers of this region pointed out, an essential ingredient for sustainable 
economic and pro-poor growth (White, 2005).
In addition, the African Development Bank believes that to facing the challenges of economic 
progress,  African countries  must  raise  their  domestic  investment  to  at  least  35 percent  of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), of which 23 percent private investment (AfDB, 2013). Thus, 
private  sector development  is  one of its  priorities.  In the WAEMU, initiatives  of African 
Development Bank are also complemented by those of the West African Development Bank.
However, countries in this region are struggling to exceed the required threshold of 23 percent 
domestic private investment.
During 2010-15, private investment in the WAEMU increased from 15.1 percent of GDP to 
16.9 percent,  while in the period 2000-09, it  increased from 11.9 percent of GDP to 13.7 
percent in 2009. Despite that, private investment is essential for sustainable economic growth 
that will help make real inroads into reducing poverty,  there is little research on the main 
determinants of private investment in this zone.
Of course, economic literature has been widely debated on this subject. In general, theoretical 
models show that private investment would positively relate among others to expected GDP 
growth,  capacity  use,  fiscal  incentives,  and would negatively affect  by real  interest  rates, 
output gap, inflation,  exchange rate,  and political  and economic volatility (Guimaraes and 
Unteroberdoerster, 2006; and Roache, 2006). The empirical literature, however, reveals other 
factors that are specific to regions, context and data futures.
Existing  studies  on  the  area  are  limited  to  the  determinants  of  foreign  direct  investment 
(Koukpo, 2005; Dje, 2007) or those of the private capital inflows (Kinda, 2008) or on the case 
of  one  member  country  (Dramani  and  Laye,  2008;  Ouattara,  2004).  Moreover,  to  our 
knowledge, there is only one study (Mbaye,  2006) that has dealt  with this subject on the 
WAEMU.
But it, however, suffers from a methodological problem as the most of work on developing 
countries using panel data. As it has recently been demonstrated in the econometric literature, 
panel data analysis, in which both cross-sectional and time dimensions are large, present non-
stationary and co-integration variables and pointed out the spurious regression problem. New 
estimators were then developed to correct this bias and to find both short-run and long-run 
relationships.
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Moreover, Mbaye's study also failed to explore certain determinants highlighted recently by 
the theoretical models, including economic and political volatility.
In this article, we extend the literature on the private investment determinants in developing 
countries by exploring both short-run and long-run factors in the WAEMU region, and by 
using recent estimators  developed in the econometric  literature.  The purpose is  to offer a 
better understanding of the private sector investments in this region.
The  rest  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Next  section  offers  an  overview  of  the 
theoretical  and empirical  literature.  Section three expose the methodological  approach and 
section  four  presents  results,  discussion,  and  an  analysis  of  the  robustness.  Concluding 
remarks and policy implications are provided in the last section.
2. - Overview of the literature
Private investment behavior has been widely debated in the economic literature, as well as 
theoretical works and empirical studies for a variety of countries.
2.1. - Theory
Theoretical  models  indicate  that  private  investment,  which  comprises  residential,  non-
residential investment by corporations, and inventories, will determine among others by real 
interest  rates,  cost  of  factors  production  and  competitiveness,  expected  market-specific, 
aggregate demand conditions, and political volatility.
2.1.1. - Real interest rates
Neoclassical  theory of  investment,  as  first  formalized  by Jorgenson (1963),  suggests  that 
private investment has been negatively affected by real interest rates. For example, if interest 
rates high then it makes it expensive for entrepreneurs to borrow to invest. Thus, investment is 
relatively less attractive because the difference between the marginal return on investment and 
the marginal cost of capital reduces.
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), known as financial liberalization theory advocates, find 
the opposite effect. These authors suggest that an increase in real interest rates has a positive 
effect on the volume and the investment quality (Lugo, 2008) because it stimulates saving and 
rule  out  investment  projects  with  low productivity.  But  there  is  good  reason  to  believe, 
however, that, in many developing countries such a flexible response of supply in the short-
run may be impossible because of bottlenecks in the supply of certain factors of production, 
such as skilled labor,  that  are essential  complements  to increase investment  (International 
Monetary Fund, 1983).
 In the new consensus in macroeconomic about interest rates behavior, or the so-called new 
Keynesian economics (Woodford, 2003; Bank of England, 2005), there is no link between 
real  interest  rate  and  private  investment  in  the  long-term.  The  real  interest  rate  is  an 
equilibrium and this rate is often seen to correspond to what is called the Wicksellian (1898) 
“natural rate” of interest rate. The equilibrium real interest rate secures output at the supply 
equilibrium level (zero output gap) with consistent inflation (Arestis, 2009). In the short-run, 
however, there is a link between real interest rate, private investment and output due to the 
discrepancy between actual and equilibrium rate of interest rate.
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2.1.2. - Cost of factors production and competitiveness
The cost and productivity of factors production and competitiveness, as the determinants of 
private investment, operate through three main channels: real exchange rate variability, capital 
good and intermediate goods, such as: oil, electricity or water, and other inputs of production 
such as wages. In general, if the cost of factors production increases, the marginal cost of 
investment will rise, and the capital stock desire will decrease and investments as well.
Theoretical  models  show  that  exchange  rate  volatility  is  positively  related  to  private 
investment because it raises the expected profitability of capital, increases the desired capital 
stock  and  boosts  the  level  of  investment  (Hartman,  1972).  But  if  the  volatility  raises 
profitability of all investment projects, it makes their ranking uncertain (Bernanke, 1983).
Besides  these  aspects,  fiscal  and  monetary  infrastructures,  such  as,  credit  rating,  and 
macroeconomic stability, such as less variability of government consumption, nominal money 
growth, and real exchange, are also positively related to private investment. Macroeconomic 
stability signs that the economy can support private investment because it reduces the risk of 
investment and promotes investment, in particular the long-run investment (Manyong and al., 
2005).  As the long-run private investment  is  largely irreversible,  private investors will  be 
unwilling to commit large expenditure to long-term fixed investment when there is economic 
volatility.
Recently,  Pischke  (2005)  suggest  that,  if  firm  can  increase  worker  productivity  through 
investments in capital  or training and claim the resulting rents, the increase in wage costs 
induces an increase in fixed capital investments.
2.1.3. - Expected market-specific and aggregate demand conditions
Market  size  has  been  identified  in  the  literature  as  an  important  determinant  of  private 
investment. Theoretically, the larger the market size, the higher the demand for more foods 
and services and the desire to capital stock progresses and investment due to the induced scale 
effect on the profitability.
Openness to international  trade is also an important aspect of market-specific because the 
more  open  an  economy,  the  more  it  attracts  foreign  private  investment  in  international 
tradable goods due to the potential for participation in internal trade.
Besides  these  aspects,  fiscal  and monetary  infrastructures,  for  example,  credit  rating,  and 
macroeconomy stability, such as less variability of government consumption, nominal money 
growth, and real exchange, are also positively related to private investment. Macroeconomic 
stability signs that the economy can support private investment because it reduces the risk of 
investment and promotes investment, in particular the long-run investment (Manyong and al., 
2005).  As the long-run private investment  is  largely irreversible,  private investors will  be 
unwilling to commit large expenditure to long-term fixed investment when there is economic 
volatility.
2.1.4. - Political volatility
Theory  indicates  the  positive  link  relationship  between  political  stability  and  private 
investment. Serven (2003) suggests that this relationship is based on the assumption that one 
part  of  private  investment,  for  example,  long-run  investment  or  fixed  investment,  is 
irreversible.  This  irreversibility  of  investment  may  be  subject  to  a  credibility  problem 
whereby  a  government  has  an  incentive  to  change  taxes  or  regulations  ex  post  with  the 
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knowledge that investors can not easily withdraw (Stasavage, 2000). One way of illustrating 
this is with the well-known time-consistency problem in capital taxation. Given that capital 
investment  decisions  often  involve  a  high degree  of  irreversibility,  governments  can  face 
incentives to raise capital taxes ex post.
The positive relationship between political stability and private investment assumes then that 
private  investors avoid imperfect  competition and decreasing to scale (Dixit  and Pindyck, 
1993).
Since theory pointed out political stability importance in the private investment process, it has 
produced very little consensus on the measures of political instability. Political instability can 
be measured by the frequency of revolutions, coups, or wars (Mankiw and al., 1995). It can 
also be computed by frequent regime changes, or political uncertainty and violence (Person 
and Tabellini, 2006) or by political freedom and index of democracy (Fend, 2001).
2.2. - Empirical evidence
Most empirical  studies about the determinants  of private  investment  confirmed theoretical 
predictions. Some works, however, find contrary effects while others show mixed effects.
With regard to the real interest rate, Ghura and Goodwin (2000) suggest that, in developing 
countries, such as Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America, from 1975 to 1992, private 
investment is stimulated by declines in real interest rates. Greene and Villanueva (1991) find 
the same results in developing countries, from 1975 to 1987, while Khurshid (2015) indicates 
that interest rate has negative relation in the long-run but positive in the short-run on private 
investment in Jiangsu Province of China from 2003 to 2012.
On the  other  hand,  Athukorala  (1998) confirms  financial  liberalization  school  of  thought 
theory.  He  demonstrates  through  an  empirical  inquiry  into  the  interest  rate,  saving,  and 
investment nexus in the Indian economy, from 1955 to 1995, that higher real interest rates 
seem to promote both financial and total savings, and stimulate private investment. Munir and 
al. (2010) find the same results in Pakistan during 1973 to 2007, supporting complementarity 
hypothesis of Mckinnon-Shaw (1973).
Osundina and al. (2014) find no strong empirical evidence that there is a link between interest 
rate and investment decision in Nigeria.
Others  studies emphasized  that  the availability  and not  the cost of  finance  represents the 
major constraint to private investment (Wai and Wond, 1982).
Concerning the real exchange rate, Dhakal and al. (2010) suggest that exchange rate volatility 
has  a  favorable  effect  on  private  investment  through  foreign  direct  investment  in  China, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand, countries that have continued to 
attract  considerable  foreign  direct  investment.  Results  are  consistent  with  theoretical 
predictions.
Serven  (2003)  finds,  however,  that  it  has  a  strong  negative  effect  on  investment,  after 
controlling for other standard investment determinants and taking into account their potential 
endogeneity. In addition, he indicates that there is some evidence of threshold effects, so that 
uncertainty only matters when it exceeds some critical level. In addition, the negative effect of 
real exchange rate uncertainty on investment is much larger in economies that are highly open 
and in those with less developed financial systems.
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About  other  inputs  of  production  such as  wages,  Cuong (2013)  employs  a  difference-in-
difference method with propensity score matching and finds no statistically significant effect 
on firm profits in Vietnam after a minimum wage hike of about 20 percent in 2015, while 
Rama (2001) suggests that  an increase in wages by,  for example,  doubling the minimum 
wage, has led to a decrease in employment of 2 percent and 5 percent decrease in investment 
in the Indonesia.
As  for  the  effect  of  macroeconomic  stability,  constructing  an  index  of  macroeconomic 
volatility that is a weighted average of three indicators: government consumption, nominal 
money growth, and real exchange rate, proxying for fiscal, monetary and external volatility, 
respectively,  Aizenman  and  Marion  (1998)  find  a  significant  correlation  between 
macroeconomic stability and private investment in developing countries.
If  empirical  research  demonstrates  that  the  macroeconomic  stability  promotes  private 
investment through the confident channel, it also finds that political stability is an important 
aspect. Guillaumont and al. (1999) have shown that political instability is a key variable to 
explain the systematic  under-performance of African countries from 1970 to 1990. In the 
Middle East and North Africa region, Zouhaier and Kefi (2012) find no effect exerted by 
political instability on private investment and economic growth, but they, however, indicate a 
negative interaction between political instability and investment from 2000 to 2009..
3. - Methodology and Data
3.1. - Model Specification
Historically,  studies  addressing  the  determinants  of  private  investments  in  developing 
countries  have  treated  internal  country-specific  factors,  external  factors  and  policy 
management factors as we discuss in the above. McNabb and LeMay-Boucher (2014) pointed 
out  that  estimation  of  most  economics  models  requires  heterogeneous  coefficients,  in 
particular the studies addressing development economics. According to this evolution in the 
literature, our private investment equation is assumed to take the following representation:
y i , t=βi x i , t+μi , t
μi ,t=αi f t+εi , t
 (1)
The heterogeneous coefficients are randomly distributed around a common mean, βi = β + νi, 
νi is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) with mean zero and finite variance σ2. ft is 
an unobserved common factors and αi a heterogeneous factor.
Yi,t represents the private investment (Ipi,t) of country i in time t. Xi,t, potentials determinants 
such as public investment (Ig), real gross domestic product (GDP), output gap (GapGDP), 
real  interest  rate  (R),  inflation  rate  (INFL),  domestic  credit  to  private  sector  (CRED), 
government consumption (GOUV), terms of trade (TOT), degree of openness to international 
trade (OUV), and political stability (POLS).
Ip, Ig, GDP, CRED, GOUV, are treated in logarithm form. Thus, their coefficients represent 
public  investment,  gross  domestic  product,  domestic  credit  to  private  sector,  government 
consumption elasticities to private investment, respectively, while others coefficients capture 
the  semi-elasticities  of  output  gap,  real  interest  rate,  inflation,  terms  of  trade,  degree  of 
openness to international trade, and political stability.
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3.2 - Data Description and Pre Diagnostic Tests
The data set consist of annual observations, from 1995 to 2014, and cover seven member 
countries of the WAEMU region: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, 
and Togo. Guinea-Bissau is excluded, due to data unavailability. Real interest rate have been 
gained from the Central Bank of West African States database, political stability,  from the 
Global  Economy  database  while  others  data  were  obtained  from  the  data  set  of  World 
Development Indicators (See Appendix A for definitions and sources of variables).
As a common wisdom in panel data analysis, econometric method involves a battery of pre 
and post diagnostic tests, checking for unit root and co-integration. The results of panel unit 
root tests, supporting unbalanced panel data, of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003); and Maddala 
and Wu (1999),  and Choi  (2001),  indicate  certain  variables  are  stationary in  level,  while 
others are stationary in first difference (Table 1). In addition, Westerlund (2007) tests largely 
conclude that the null hypotheses of no co-integration are rejected for gross domestic product, 
domestic credit to private sector, and government consumption (Table 2).
Table 1: Summary Results of Panel Unit Root Tests
Variables Im, Pesaran and Shin Maddala and Wu Order of integration
Ip, first difference with trend -6.3*** 3.0*** I (1)
Ig, first difference with trend -6.1*** 11.4*** I (1)
GDP, first difference with trend -5.5*** 11.9*** I (1)
CRED, first difference with trend -5.9*** 6.0*** I (1)
GOUV, with trend -3.9*** 3.7*** I (0)
GapGDP, level -5.6*** 13.6*** I (0)
INFL, level -6.8*** 18.5*** I (0)
TOT, level -5.5*** 11.4*** I (0)
OUV, first difference with trend -5.1*** 1.3* I (1)
R, level -4.6*** 3.8*** I (0)
Source:  Author,  ***,  **,  and  *  indicate  that  the  statistic  is  statistically  significant  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%  levels,  
respectively. The null hypothesis of stationarity tests are = Non stationarity.
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Table 2: Westerlund Error Correction Based Panel Co-integration Tests
Variables
Private Investment, Ip
Gt Ga Pt Pa Co-integrated
Ig -1,8 -6,7 -3,7 -4,2 No
GDP -2,4** -9 -5,2* -7.3** Yes
CRED -2,2* -6,3 -6,1** -6,8** Yes
GOUV -1,6 -7,9 -4,3 -7** Yes
GapGDP -0,2 -0,4 -2,6 -1,5 No
INFL -0,2 -0,4 -1,9 -1 No
TOT -0,4 -0,7 -2,7 -1,6 No
OUV -1 -2,4 -3,6 -2,9 No
POLS -0.4 -0,9 -3,5 -2,5 No
R -1,2 -3,1 -3,8 -2,4 No
Source:  Author,  ***,  **,  and  *  indicate  that  the  statistic  is  statistically  significant  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10% levels,  
respectively. The null hypothesis of Westerlund test is = Non co-integration.
3.3. - Estimation Techniques
This feature of the data implies an Error Correction Model Specification in which the short-
run dynamics of the variables in the system are influenced by the deviation from equilibrium. 
Thus, the equation (1) is become as follows:
Δ yi ,t=γi( yi ,t−1−θi x i ,t)+γ0, i+δiΔ x i ,t+εi , t  (2)
The parameter γi is the error-correcting speed of adjustment term. If γ i = 0, then there would 
be no evidence for the long-run relationship. This parameter is expected to be significantly 
negative under the prior assumption that the variables show a return to a long-run equilibrium.
The  recent  literature  on  dynamic  heterogeneous  panel  estimation,  in  which  both  cross-
sectional  and  time  dimensions  are  large,  with  a  co-integration  mixed  of  I (0)  and  I (1) 
variables, suggests several approaches to estimate equation (2) (See Blackburne and Frank 
(2007) for more details).
On one extreme, a Dynamic Fixed-Effects (DFE) estimation approach could be used in which 
the time-series data for each country are pooled and only the intercepts are allowed to differ 
across countries. If the slope coefficients are in fact not identical, however, the DFE approach 
produces inconsistent  and potentially misleading results.  On the other extreme,  the model 
could be fitted separately for each country, and a simple arithmetic average of the coefficients 
could be calculated. This is the Mean Group (MG), estimator proposed by Pesaran and Smith 
(1995).  With  this  estimator,  the  intercepts,  slope  coefficients,  and  error  variances  are  all 
allowed to differ across country.
Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1997, 1999) have proposed a Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator 
that combines both pooling and averaging. This intermediate estimator allows the intercept, 
short-run coefficients, and error variances to differ across the countries (as would the MG 
estimator) but constrains the long-run coefficients to be equal across countries (as would the 
DFE estimator).
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More recently, Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1997, 1999) have proposed a Pooled Mean Group 
(PMG)  estimator  that  combines  both  pooling  and  averaging.  This  intermediate  estimator 
allows the intercept, short-run coefficients, and error variances to differ across the countries 
(as  would  the  MG estimator)  but  constrains  the  long-run  coefficients  to  be  equal  across 
countries (as would the DFE estimator). Hausman specification test is performed to obtain the 
estimator that is efficient and consistent according to the data feature.
4. - Results, Analysis and Discussion
Results show that the Pooled Mean Group estimator, the efficient estimator under the null 
hypothesis, is preferred to Mean Group estimator. The calculated Hausman statistic is 3.69 
and is distributed Chi2. But it's also confirm that the Dynamic Fixed-Effects estimator is more 
efficient and consistent than the Pooled Mean Group estimator, according to Hausman test, 
checking for  endogeneity between the error  term and the lagged dependent  variable.  The 
calculated Hausman statistic is 4,339.76 with a corresponding p-value of zero (Table 3). In 
addition, residuals of the models are checked and the skewness and kurtosis suggest normally 
distributed residuals, implying the robustness of models.
Table 3: Hausman's models Specification Tests, Optimal Estimator
MG vs PMG DFE vs PMG
Chi2 Statistic  3.69 4,339.76***
P-value 0.30 0.00
Source:  Author,  ***,  **,  and  *  indicate  that  the  statistic  is  statistically  significant  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%  levels,  
respectively.
Moreover, the error correction term, the adjustment coefficient, has a negative and statistically 
significant  value  (-0.60).  This  infers  that,  the  model  is  dynamically  stable,  and  private 
investment in the WAEMU adjusts fast to equilibrium levels in the current period, from a 
disequilibrium experienced  in  the  earlier  period  after  a  shock to  any of  its  determinants. 
Furthermore, the significant coefficients do not change when we remove certain candidate 
variables, confirming the robustness of the model taking to account omitted variables bias 
problem.
The Dynamic Fixed-Effects results (Table 4, short-run, and Table 5, long-run) suggest that, in 
the short-run, private investment in the WAEMU zone is determined by the aggregate demand 
conditions: gross domestic product and output gap, while, in the long-run, it is determined by 
public investment, gross domestic product, and political stability.
The short-run elasticity of gross domestic product and output gap are statistically significant 
and average to 5.7 and 0.06,  respectively.  These finds  imply that  a  one percentage  point 
increase  in  gross  domestic  product  may  rise  in  overall  5.7  percentages  points  of  private 
investment in the short-run. Furthermore, in the short-run, private investment evolves in the 
same direction of the business cycle with 0.06 elasticity. For example, if the output gap falls  
of 10 percentages points, private investment decreases by 0.6 percentage point. These results 
confirmed the theoretical models, in particular the accelerator principle, an idea suggests that 
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aggregate  net  investment  by  firms  is  dependent  on  firms  expectations  about  changes  in 
outputs.
The  long-run  elasticity  of  gross  domestic  product  and  public  investment  are  statistically 
significant  and average  to  2.4  and -0.16,  respectively,  and the  semi-elasticity  of  political 
stability is -0.25. The statistical significant of gross domestic product and political stability 
coefficients  do  not  change  when  we  remove  certain  candidate  variables,  confirming  the 
robustness of their effects, while public investment losses it significance. These results show 
that  a  one  percentage  point  increase  in  gross  domestic  product  may  rise  in  overall  2.4 
percentages points of private investment in the long-run. Moreover, when the economies of 
the WAEMU zone make an effort of 10 units raking to stabilize their political framework, it 
promotes private investment about 2.5 percentages points.
These  finds  are  consistent  with  the  theoretical  predictions  of  the  long-run  relationship 
between private investment and output and political stability. But theoretical models suggest 
that public investment may be negatively affected private investment because it increases the 
opportunity cost of borrowing money through interest rates rising, the so-called “crowd out 
effect”. However, the empirical work undertakes by Keho (2016) suggests that public deficits 
do not affected private consumption in the WAEMU region during 1970 to 2013.
The results also show, however, that there is no statistical evidence, both in short-run and 
long-run, impact  of inflation,  terms of trade,  real interest  rate,  and degree of openness to 
international trade in the WAEMU region from 1995 to 2014.
Table 4. Short-Run Dynamic Fixed-Effects Estimation of the Private Investment Determinants
VARIABLES M1 M2 M3 M4
EC -0.602*** -0.580*** -0.581*** -0.576***
(0.0815) (0.0834) (0.0824) (0.0734)
D.IG -0.0355 -0.0414 -0.0387 -0.0344
(0.0879) (0.0856) (0.0862) (0.0871)
D.GDP 6.464*** 5.807*** 5.260** 5.091***
(1.954) (1.778) (2.158) (1.905)
D.GAPGDP -0.0691*** -0.0591*** -0.0535** -0.0506**
(0.0198) (0.0194) (0.0268) (0.0251)
D.R 0.0142 0.00581 0.00741* 0.00706**
(0.0102) (0.00432) (0.00385) (0.00353)
D.INFL 0.00725
(0.00991)
D.CRED 0.0249 0.0259
(0.0175) (0.0167)
D.TOT 0.000270 0.000214 0.000188
(0.000245) (0.000249) (0.000271)
D.OUV -0.000137 8.39e-05 0.00320 0.00347
(0.00566) (0.00555) (0.00661) (0.00626)
D.GOUV 0.126** 0.132*** 0.138*** 0.148***
(0.0627) (0.0446) (0.0533) (0.0488)
D.POLS 0.0603 0.0401 0.0505 0.0347
(0.0658) (0.0702) (0.0676) (0.0721)
Source: Author,  Robust standard errors (in parentheses) and cluster the standard errors at country level *** p<0.01, **  
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5. Long-Run Dynamic Fixed-Effects Estimation of the Private Investment Determinants
VARIABLES M1 M2 M3 M4
Ig -0.195** -0.166 -0.140 -0.127
(0.0931) (0.102) (0.0953) (0.0811)
GDP 2.414*** 2.136*** 2.510*** 2.469***
(0.718) (0.748) (0.696) (0.698)
GapGDP 0.0461 0.0441 0.0468 0.0436
(0.0356) (0.0344) (0.0315) (0.0333)
R -0.00495 -0.0137 -0.0153 -0.0146
(0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0138)
INFL 0.0178
(0.0195)
CRED -0.00935 -0.0130
(0.0208) (0.0225)
TOT -0.000478 -0.000508 -0.000717
(0.000606) (0.000729) (0.000695)
OUV 0.0122 0.0122 0.00797 0.00868
(0.00947) (0.00960) (0.00958) (0.00937)
GOUV 0.125 0.211 -0.122 -0.109
(0.336) (0.368) (0.195) (0.196)
POLS -0.254** -0.248** -0.258*** -0.247***
(0.0994) (0.104) (0.0835) (0.0783)
CONS -8.158*** -6.863** -7.475** -7.318**
(2.692) (2.785) (2.997) (2.902)
Source: Author,  Robust standard errors (in parentheses) and cluster the standard errors at country level *** p<0.01, **  
p<0.05, * p<0.1
5. - Conclusion and Policy Implications
Private  investment  is  recently  identified  as  the  important  way of  developing  countries  to 
discuss  their  sustainable  economic  growth  challenges.  While  WAEMU  region  has 
experienced  rapid  economic  growth  compared  to  the  average  of  African  countries,  this 
economic progress has been driven essentially by public investment. The aim, according to 
policymakers'  views, is to create conditions for private investment development  and more 
sustainable economic growth. It is therefore important to look into ways that can stimulate 
private sector and private investment of this area.
To  contribute  to  this  reflection,  this  paper  investigates  the  main  determinants  of  private 
investment in this region with a dynamic approach by exploring both short-run and long-run 
factors in this zone, and by using recent estimators developed in the econometric literature.
Results suggest that, in the short-run, private investment in the WAEMU region is determined 
by the aggregate demand conditions: gross domestic product and output gap, while, in the 
long-run, it is determined by gross domestic product, and political  stability.  The short-run 
elasticity of gross domestic product and output gap are statistically significant and average to 
5.7 and 0.06, respectively.  The long-run elasticity of gross domestic product and the semi-
elasticity  of  political  stability  are  statistically  significant  and  average  to  2.4  and  -0.25, 
respectively. As policy implications, these finds imply that, to promote private investment in 
the WAEMU zone, there is a need among others for more proper design and implementation 
of aggregate demand management policies, and political framework stability.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Definitions and Sources of Variables
Variables Definitions Sources
Private investment Ip = ln [Gross fixed capital formation, private sector]
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) of the 
World Bank
Public investment Ig = ln [Gross fixed capital formation, public sector]
Gross domestic product GDP = ln [Gross domestic product (constant 2005)]
Domestic credit to private sector CRED = ln (Credit to Private Sector / GDP)
Government consumption GOUV = ln (General government final consumption expenditure)
Output gap
GapGDP = [(GDP – Potential GDP) / 
Potential GDP] in percentage. Potential GDP 
is calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter.
Inflation INFL = Consumer prices (annual percentage)
Terms of trade TOT = Annual percentage of Net barter terms of trade index (2000 = 100)
Degree of openness to 
international trade
OUV = (Exportation + Importation)/(2*GDP) 
in percentage
Political Stability POL = Political stability index
The Global Economy 
Database
Real interest rate R = (Annual Average Credit Interest Rate – Inflation Interest Rate) BCEAO Database Eden
Source: Author
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